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REFORMULATING CHURCH AUTONOMY: HOW
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v. SMITH PROVIDES A
FRAMEWORK FOR FIXING THE NEUTRAL
PRINCIPLES APPROACH
Andrew Soukup*
INTRODUCTION
Gordon Hensley began working for Newport Church of the Naza-
rene in 1993 as a youth minister.' Eight months later, the church
fired Hensley because he disrupted staff cohesiveness and lost the sup-
port of church members. 2 After his termination, Hensley filed a claim
for unemployment benefits.3 When the Employment Appeals Board
granted his request for benefits, Newport Church challenged the
application of the benefits law as an unconstitutional intrusion into its
autonomy under the First Amendment. 4 The Oregon Supreme Court
rejected the church's argument, concluding that because the unem-
ployment law was neutral and generally applicable, the court could
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 2004. 1 would like to thank Professor Richard W. Garnett for his
invaluable guidance during the planning stages of this Note and for his helpful
comments during the writing process, and Professor Paul Horwitz for his useful
suggestions on an earlier draft. I am also grateful for the members of the Notre Dame
Law Review for the effort they expended in diligently preparing this piece for
publication. Most of all, thank you to my family for their unconditional love and
support throughout my life.
1 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 56 P.3d 386, 388 (Or. 2002).
2 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 983 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Or. Ct.
App. 1999), aff d in part and rev'd in part, 56 P.3d 386. The church did not initially
challenge the Employment Appeals Board's finding that the decision to terminate
employment was based on misconduct. See Newport Church, 56 P.3d at 393 n.7. If it
had, the church would have been excused under Oregon law from paying unemploy-
ment benefits. See Newport Church, 983 P.2d at 1075. When it attempted to do so at a
later stage in the litigation, the motion was denied. See Newport Church, 56 P.3d at 393
n.7.
3 Newport Church, 56 P.3d at 388.
4 Id. at 388, 392.
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constitutionally force Newport Church to pay unemployment
benefits. 5
Religious organizations like Newport Church of the Nazarene
increasingly rely on the church autonomy doctrine to defend them-
selves from government regulation and private party litigation. Under
the doctrine of church autonomy, 6 which draws its strength from the
First Amendment, 7 courts may not review "internal church disputes
involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity."8
However, courts may adjudicate disputes involving ecclesiastical enti-
ties using so-called neutral principles of law, provided courts ignore
doctrinal controversies as they apply those principles. 9 Although the
phrase "church autonomy"10 has appeared only twice in the U.S.
Reports-and each appearance consisted of a title of an academic arti-
cle in a citation' '-religious organizations have sought the doctrine's
protection in a multitude of contexts. Churches have relied on the
doctrine in disputes over civil rights,12 negligent hiring, supervision,
and retention,1 3 breach of contract,' 4 tortious interference with busi-
5 Id. at 392-94.
6 Professor Douglas Laycock is widely credited with popularizing this phrase in
his influential article, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981).
7 See infra note 62.
8 Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir.
2002); see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
9 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment:
The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1385, 1589
("The First Amendment, with its doctrine of church autonomy, is a recognition ...
that the civil courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the internal affairs of
religious organizations.").
10 For the purposes of this Note, the phrases "church autonomy" and "the church
autonomy doctrine" have different meanings. See infra text accompanying notes
37-48.
11 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341-42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Lay-
cock, supra note 6, at 1389); Jones, 443 U.S. at 620 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Paul
G. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, in
CHURCH AND STATE 67, 90-92, 97-98 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1975)).
12 See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800-05
(4th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Method-
ist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 702-15 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
13 See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 354-57 (Fla. 2002); Roman Catholic
Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1235-38 (Miss. 2005); Gibson v.
Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-48 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
14 See Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681,
683-84 (I11. App. Ct. 1994); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 856-59 (N.J. 2002).
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ness relationships,
15 civil conspiracy, 16 clergy malpractice,
17 collective
bargaining, 18 sexual harassment,
19 negligent infliction of emotional
distress, 20 premises liability,
21 and various procedural issues.
2 2
Despite the ease with which courts set forth 
church autonomy
principles, the doctrine creates a myriad 
of practical and doctrinal
problems. In the practical context, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that
courts can constitutionally burden church 
autonomy as this Note uses
the term, 23 but it never defined the degree 
of permissible interfer-
ence. Consequently, courts have proven 
institutionally incapable of
drawing a line separating permissible and 
impermissible infringement
on the internal affairs of a religious organization.
2 4 Defining what
constitutes impermissible entanglement 
with religion is an inherently
difficult task.25 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. HenslWy
2 6 aptly illus-
15 See Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, 
Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286,
293-94 (Ind. 2003).
16 See Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 773 
N.E.2d 929, 934-39 (Mass. 2002).
17 See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker, 913 S.W.2d 
761, 767 (Ark. 1996); see also infra
notes 254-55 and accompanying text (examining courts' 
approaches to clergy mal-
practice claims).
18 See S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. 
v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 723 
(N.J. 1997).
19 See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese 
of Colo., 289 F.3d 648,
655-59 (10th Cir. 2002); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y 
of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940,
945-48 (9th Cir. 1999).
20 See, e.g., Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 
No. Civ.A. 03-2150-KHV, 2004 WL
74318, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2004).
21 Cf, e.g., Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 614 
N.W.2d 88, 102 (Mich.
2000) (holding that a person attending bible study on church 
premises was a licensee
for purposes of a duty of care without considering 
the First Amendment).
22 See, e.g., Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 
No. Civ.A. 03-2150-KHV-DJW, 2004
WL 624962, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 9, 2004) (permitting deposition 
of church members
when information sought to be discovered was 
secular); People v. Campobello, 810
N.E.2d 307, 665-67 (111. App. Ct. 2004) (enforcing a subpoena 
in criminal investiga-
tion); Soc'y of Jesus of New Eng. v. Commonwealth, 
808 N.E.2d 272, 278-79 (Mass.
2004) (enforcing a subpoena in a criminal investigation).
23 This Note defines church autonomy with 
reference to the internal affairs of a
religious institution, even decidedly nonreligious 
aspects. By contrast, others define
church autonomy as the sphere of constitutionally 
protected religious group activity.
The difference is mostly one of semantics, 
as both approaches ultimately seek to
define which religious group activities are 
immune from government interference.
The primary difference in terminology only 
means that under this Note's definition
of church autonomy, see infra text accompanying notes 
37-40, an action that falls
within the definition of church autonomy might 
not be entitled to constitutional pro-
tection; such a result is impossible under other 
approaches.
24 See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
25 The contradictory and conflicting approaches 
discussed below, infra Part I.B,
illustrate the intrinsic difficulty in resolving this 
inquiry. A plethora of scholars have
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trates the difficulty of determining when the government unconstitu-
tionally interferes with church autonomy. The church argued that the
unemployment law threatened its institutional autonomy in two ways:
first, if it was required to disclose and justify its reasons for firing a
religious leader, it might not terminate the minister; and second, the
burden imposed by paying unemployment benefits might cause the
church to refrain from firing a minister. 27 The law imposed a burden
on the church-minister relationship, which has historically enjoyed
special protection, 2 but the Oregon Supreme Court held that requir-
ing churches to pay unemployment benefits to ministers did not vio-
late the doctrine of church autonomy.29
Similarly, in the doctrinal context, some have questioned the via-
bility of the church autonomy doctrine following Employment Division
v. Smith.30 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that neutral, generally
applicable laws that incidentally burden the religious conduct of indi-
viduals do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 3' Supporters of a
broad right to church autonomy thus struggle to answer how religious
groups can claim that they are exempt from generally applicable laws
when individuals lack the same immunity. 2 Indeed, Newport Church
rested its decision in part on the fact that the principles of Smith
defeated the church's claim to autonomy.33
already attempted to address the proper scope of the church autonomy doctrine. See,
e.g., Symposium, Church Autonomy Conference, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1093; see also Gerard V.
Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State?, 49
LA. L. REv. 1057 (1989) (arguing for an increase in religious-based political discussion
to prevent neutral principles from infringing upon church autonomy); Laycock, supra
note 6, at 1397 (calling for a broad right of church autonomy that "extends to all
aspects of church autonomy"); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of
Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VitL. L. REv. 37 (2002) (examining
different perspectives to evaluate the best method for protecting religious freedom).
26 56 P.3d 386 (Or. 2002).
27 Id. at 393.
28 See infra Part III.C.
29 Newport Church, 56 P,3d at 394.
30 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31 Id. at 882-90.
32 See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising
Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633, 1635; Perry Dane, "Omalous" Autonomy, 2004
BYU L. REV. 1715, 1715-16; Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-
Group Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1773, 1774.
33 Newport Church, 56 P.3d at 392-93. But see, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the church
autonomy doctrine remains viable after Smith because those cases "address[ I the
rights of the church, not the rights of individuals").
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This Note seeks to resolve these practical and doctrinal difficul-
ties by providing courts with a meaningful framework for applying the
church autonomy doctrine. This framework reconciles the principles
elucidated in Smith with historical and precedential evidence favoring
constitutional protection for some aspects of church autonomy.34
Under this framework, courts must first determine whether the appli-
cable rule of decision in a dispute involving a religious organization is
a neutral principle of law, which the Supreme Court has defined in a
similar context as a rule that does not target beliefs or restrict relig-
ious practices purely because of their religious quality.35 If such a
principle exists, courts should presume they can resolve the dispute
without unconstitutionally interfering with the internal affairs of a
church. Religious entities can rebut that presumption by showing that
government action interferes with one of three constitutionally pro-
tected spheres of autonomy presently supported by Supreme Court
precedent. Based on historical influences and the guiding principles
of Smith, the church autonomy doctrine avoids the constitutional
problems associated with religious-based exemptions for individual
conduct and remains consistent with historical attitudes toward relig-
ious organizations if it defines spheres where religious activity is pro-
tected instead of creating specific religious-based exemptions.
Part I explains how courts, based on the guidance of the Supreme
Court, abandoned their historical approach of declining jurisdiction
in cases involving religious disputes as they embraced the belief that
they could adjudicate such disputes by applying neutral principles of
law. However, this jurisprudential shift created an unworkable and
inconsistent case-by-case approach, showing why the Supreme Court
initially adopted bright-line rules against government involvement in
church affairs. Part II argues that historical attitudes toward religious
groups and First Amendment principles announced in Smith suggest
courts should abandon the case-by-case method in favor of a broad
presumption that assumes courts can always adjudicate disputes
involving religious organizations without violating the First Amend-
ment. Part III suggests that religious organizations can rebut the
34 Some might argue that "church autonomy" only encompasses constitutionally
protected activity, see supra note 23, but this Note defines this term more broadly for
purely semantic reasons. For the sake of clarity, the aforementioned definition of
church autonomy is consistent with what this Note calls "constitutionally protected
spheres of church autonomy." See infra Part Il.
35 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993); see also infra text accompanying notes 175-80 (explaining how the Court's
definition of neutral laws of general applicability in Lukumi Babalu can also apply in
the church autonomy context).
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aforementioned presumption by showing that the 
government action
infringes upon one of three narrowly defined spheres 
of autonomous
conduct that the Supreme Court previously established: 
dogma,
authority, and the church-minister relationship. 
For those who fear
this framework fails to protect religious freedom, 
Part IV illustrates
how other constitutional provisions and the democratic 
process also
adequately safeguard religious group autonomy. 
While neither
approach protects institutional autonomy as well 
as the robust church
autonomy doctrine espoused by some commentators,
36 as a practical
matter, legislatures eagerly grant numerous exemptions 
for religious
groups from a variety of laws. Consequently, religious 
institutions
have sufficient means for preserving their internal 
affairs from govern-
ment interference, making it unnecessary for courts 
to determine that
new spheres of church activities deserve constitutional 
protection
under the church autonomy doctrine.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE CHURCH AUTONOMY 
DOCTRINE
"Church autonomy" and the "church autonomy 
doctrine" do not
mean the same thing. Church autonomy refers 
to the idea that a
religious institution should have control over its polity, faith, 
doctrine,
and other internal affairs.
37 The principle depends for its recognition
upon a fundamental right of churches to "'decide 
for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church government 
as well as those
of faith and doctrine.'
38 The Supreme Court has never used the
phrase "church autonomy" in its opinions to describe 
its jurispru-
dence, 39 nor has it addressed the extent of free exercise 
protection in
the context of religious groups since Smith. Almost 
any government
action, if applied to churches, can impact church 
autonomy to some
extent. For example, the law at issue in Newport 
Church, from the
church's perspective, governed payments a church 
must make to its
employees if it decided to fire them.
40 The law certainly implicated
church government, for it influenced the church's 
decision to fire an
employee. It also implicated church doctrine by affecting 
the church-
minister relationship. Without the unemployment 
law, the church
need not take the decision to pay benefits into 
account; with the
36 See infra note 127 (discussing broad conceptions of church 
autonomy).
37 Laycock, supra note 6, at 1373 ("[C]hurches have a constitutionally 
protected
interest in managing their own institutions free 
of government interference.").
38 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 
455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 
116 (1952)).
39 Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the 
No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1112-13.
40 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 
56 P.3d 386, 393 (Or. 2002).
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unemployment law, the church knew that a decision to terminate an
employee carried a corresponding duty imposed by state law to pay
benefits to the employee. In the strictest sense of the word, then, the
unemployment law burdened Newport Church of the Nazarene's
autonomy.
By contrast, the church autonomy doctrine determines the
degree to which the government may constitutionally intrude upon
church autonomy. For a legislative body, the church autonomy doc-
trine provides the standard against which otherwise neutral, generally
applicable laws are evaluated.41 For a court, the church autonomy
doctrine establishes a guideline for determining when a court must
refrain from exercising full-fledged jurisdiction to avoid violating the
First Amendment.42 The church autonomy doctrine is distinguisha-
ble from other religion based constitutional protections because it
requires no balancing of the relative interests of a religious organiza-
tion and the state. 43 For example, an analysis under the Free Exercise
Clause requires a compelling governmental interest and least-restric-
tive-means inquiry.44 Similarly, the Establishment Clause directs
courts to look at the secular purpose and primary effect test.45 In the
context of the church autonomy doctrine, however,
a balancing test is [not] appropriate to determine to what extent
judicial scrutiny of [the plaintiffs] claims would offend the defend-
ants' religious freedoms under either the establishment clause, or
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The application of
First Amendment principles, in circumstances such as these,
involves no balancing test. If adjudication of the plaintiffs claims
would implicate matters of ecclesiastical relationships, the courts
should not intrude.46
Notwithstanding the arguments in favor of a broad right to
church autonomy, the Supreme Court has indicated that some inter-
ference with the internal affairs of a church is constitutional. 47 Thus,
41 See, e.g., Kedroff 344 U.S. at 110.
42 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-07 (1979).
43 L. Martin Nussbaum, Watson v. Jones and the Doctrine of Church Autonomy, THE
ROTHGERBER JOHNSON & LYONS RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ARcHiVr, Apr. 2003, http://www.
churchstatelaw.com/commentaries/watsonvjones.asp.
44 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
45 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
46 Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820, 825 (Mass. 2002) (cita-
tions omitted).
47 Cf. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605 (holding that courts do not have to defer to religious
factions in all cases); Underkuffler, supra note 32, at 1787 ("[Granting religious
groups sweeping freedom from civil laws carries with it far more costs than benefits.").
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while church autonomy refers to the right of a church to manage its
internal affairs independent of any government interference, the
church autonomy doctrine describes the inquiry courts undertake to
determine the scope of constitutionally permissible government inter-
ference with those affairs. 48
A. Watson v. Jones4 9 and its Progeny
The church autonomy doctrine is derived from a line of intra-
church disputes in which the Court was asked to determine which fac-
tion of a religious organization controlled church property. The first
of these decisions, Watson v. Jones, involved a disagreement between
two factions of a Kentucky church over whether to follow the anti-
slavery, pro-federal government policy of the Presbyterian Church's
highest tribunal. 50 Both factions claimed ownership of the church
property, and one filed suit in federal court.51 In declining to resolve
the dispute, the Court noted that when church members form a hier-
archical organization for religious purposes, civil courts must defer to
the highest entity on "questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiasti-
cal rule, custom or law."52 The Court provided three reasons for its
decision. First, individuals who unite to form hierarchical churches
voluntarily agree to abide by the decisions of church authorities, and
courts should subsequently give the church authorities' decisions
proper deference. 53 Second, civil courts are "incompetent judges" on
matters of church teaching. 54 Finally, deference protects the proper
boundaries between religion and the state. As the Court said:
[1] t is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these
matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and
48 See supra note 23.
49 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
50 Id. 715-17. This opinion has been called "the Marbuiy of institutional auton-
omy." Dane, supra note 32, at 1716.
51 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 714. Watson was decided before Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as a matter of federal common law because the Court
had not yet determined that the First Amendment applied to the states. Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952).
52 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
53 Id. at 729 ("It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to
establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those
decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance . . ").
54 Id. ("It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as com-
petent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men
in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more
leamed tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to the one which is less
SO.").
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customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization 
of every
religious denomination may, and must, be 
examined into with
minuteness and care .... This principle would 
deprive these bodies
of the right of construing their 
own church laws .... 5
Eighty years later, the Court constitutionalized 
the Watson princi-
ples. 56 In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
5 7 
"the Court used some of
its broadest language" to describe religious group 
rights. 58 Following
the Russian Revolution, the New York state 
legislature transferred con-
trol of a Russian Orthodox cathedral from 
Moscow-based religious
leaders to American church officials.
5 9 Relying principally on Watson,
the Court called the statute unconstitutional.
60 Watson, the Kedroff
Court said, "radiates.., a spirit of freedom for religious 
organizations,
an independence from secular control or manipulation, 
in short,
power to decide for themselves, free from 
state interference, matters
of church government as well as those of faith 
and doctrine."'6 1 Such
freedom, the Court said, has constitutional protection 
under the Free
Exercise Clause. 62 The extent of this constitutional 
protection was evi-
dent in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyte-
rian Church,6 3 where the Supreme Court struck 
down a state practice
of awarding property to religious factions 
on the basis of who had
55 Id. at 733-34.
56 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969); see Kedroff 344 U.S. at 116.
57 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
58 Brady, supra note 32, at 1640.
59 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 97-98.
60 Id. at 110.
61 Id. at 116; see also Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
at 446 (stating that the language
in Watson possessed "a clear constitutional ring").
62 Kedroff 344 U.S. at 116. Despite that statement, the constitutional 
source of
the church autonomy doctrine is decidedly unclear. 
After Kedroff the Court has said
that the doctrine is rooted in the First Amendment 
without identifying either the Free
Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause as 
the source. See Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712 (1976); Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. at 449.
Scholars are split on the issue. Compare Arlin M. 
Adams & William R. Hanlon,Jones v.
Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 
128 U. PA. L. REV.
1291, 1297 (1980) (arguing that the doctrine arises out of the 
interaction of the Free
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses), and Dane, supra 
note 32, at 1718-20
(same), with Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural 
Restraint on Covern-
mental Power, 84 IowA L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1998) (suggesting 
that the Establishment
Clause "sets apart from the sphere of civil government" 
matters including "ecclesiasti-
cal governance, the resolution of doctrine, the composing 
of prayers, and the teach-
ing of religion"), and Laycock, supra note 6, at 1396 (arguing 
that the doctrine is
rooted in Free Exercise concerns).
63 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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most faithfully adhered to church teaching. 64 Such an approach
"requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a
religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion. " 6 5
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Miivojevich,66 the Court later
extended the constitutional protection afforded to religious organiza-
tions to "disputes over church polity and church administration."6 7 A
defrocked bishop challenged both his removal and the power of the
Serbian Orthodox Church to reorganize his diocese. 68 The Illinois
Supreme Court called the bishop's removal invalid because the
church did not conduct its decisionmaking process in accordance
with the Church's constitution and penal code. 69 The Supreme Court
reversed, noting that the Illinois Supreme Court effectively substituted
its interpretation of church doctrine for the decision made by the
highest church authority. 70 From the Court's perspective, the church
decisions at issue concerned a "quintessentially religious" controversy
over church discipline 7 1 and an "issue at the core of ecclesiastical
affairs" involving the choice of clergy and diocesan reorganization. 72
Because the First Amendment permits religious groups to "establish
their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and govern-
ment, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these mat-
ters, "the Court ruled that "the Constitution requires that civil courts
accept their decisions as binding upon them. "1 73
Despite the broad language the Court used in Watson and its
progeny, those cases only involved narrow questions of intra-church
disputes. The subject matter of the disputes centered on control of
property,74 control over appointment of religious leaders,75 and con-
64 Id. at 449-50.
65 Id. at 450.
66 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
67 Id. at 710.
68 Id. at 706-07.
69 Serbian E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268, 281 (Ill. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 696.
70 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 722.
71 Id. at 720.
72 Id. at 721.
73 Id. at 724-25.
74 See id. at 709; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyte-
rian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 442 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94, 95 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 681 (1871).
75 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715-18; Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop,
280 U.S. 1, 10 (1929).
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trol over church organization.
76 To resolve those disputes, the
Supreme Court concluded that courts would 
have been required to
either interpret religious doctrine in some capacity 
or interfere in the
internal governance of a church. As Watson 
noted: "[R eligious lib-
erty [is protected] from the invasion of the civil authority.
' 77 The line
of cases beginning with Watson and continuing 
through Milivojevich
makes clear that some areas of church autonomy 
are entitled to con-
stitutional protection.
B. Acceptance of Neutral Principles of Law
However, the Supreme Court gradually backed 
away from its
broad pronouncements about the protected 
scope of church auton-
omy. The first movement away from an 
exclusively deferential
approach began in Presbyterian Church, where 
the Court noted that
"there are neutral principles of law, developed 
for use in all property
disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing' 
churches to
which property is awarded.
' 7' The Court elaborated on this principle
in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church 
of God
at Sharpsburg, Inc.,79 affirming in a per curiam 
opinion the decision of
a Maryland court to resolve a church property 
dispute by relying upon
statutory law because the resolution of the 
dispute "involved no
inquiry into religious doctrine.
80 The Maryland court relied on state
law, the deeds conveying the property to a local 
congregation, and the
constitution of the religious organization to 
conclude that no evi-
dence existed suggesting the parent church intended 
to retain control
over the local church property.
8 1 As the Supreme Court later
explained, the provisions of the church constitution 
were sufficiently
express to enable a civil court could analyze 
them without making an
"impermissible inquiry into church 
polity. 8 2
Three Justices, however, noted that a state 
could adopt one of
several approaches for settling church property 
disputes "so long as it
involves no consideration of doctrinal matters.
'
"
3 Under the first
76 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721; Kedroff 344 U.S. at 115.
77 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 730. Some commentators 
have relied upon this
language to conclude that church autonomy should 
receive broad protection. See
infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
78 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
79 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam).
80 Id. at 368.
81 Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God 
v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
Inc., 254 A.2d 162, 166-71 (Md. 1969), affd, 396 U.S. 367.
82 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 
723 (1976).
83 Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368-70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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approach, seen in Watson, states could enforce 
decisions made by a
majority of church members (if the church was congregational) 
or a
church tribunal (if the church was hierarchical) ,84 provided 
the court
refrained from interpreting ambiguous religious 
language to deter-
mine if a religious tribunal actually had the 
religious authority it
claimed to possess.
85 Under a second approach, embraced in 
Presbyte-
rian Church, courts could determine ownership 
by relying upon gen-
eral principles used to resolve property 
disputes unless their
application required an interpretation of religious 
doctrine. 86 Under
a third approach, taken by the Maryland Court 
of Appeals, courts
could apply special statutes passed by state 
legislatures carefully
crafted to avoid the degree of interference 
seen in Kedroff87
Eight years later, a fourth Justice also suggested 
that the deferen-
tial approach of Watson did not universally apply.
88 In an in-chambers
opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist
9 rejected an argument that the First
Amendment prevented courts from examining 
the structure and
operation of a church for purposes of determining 
whether personal
jurisdiction existed based on minimum contacts.
90 In Justice Rehn-
quist's view, the Supreme Court never suggested 
that limits on the
ability of a court to inquire into and determine 
matters of ecclesiasti-
cal organization and governance applied "outside 
the context of such
intraorganization disputes."
91 Concerns about excessive entangle-
ment in religious doctrine, Justice Rehnquist 
argued, "are not applica-
ble to purely secular disputes between third 
parties and a particular
defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, 
in which fraud,
breach of contract, and statutory violations 
are alleged."92
84 Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 236-39 (explaining 
how courts deter-
mine which faction of a church to which they 
should defer).
85 Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368-70.
86 Id. at 370.
87 Id.
88 Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. v. Cal. Super. 
Ct., 439 U.S. 1369 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, Circuit J.).
89 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, had 
dissented in Milivojevich
because "[t]here is nothing . .. to indicate that the Illinois 
courts have been instru-
ments of any such impermissible intrusion by 
the State on one side or the other of a
religious dispute." Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese 
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 733
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist saw 
no difference between the
church constitutional provision at issue in 
Maryland & Virginia Eldership and the case
at hand. Id. at 734.
90 Gen. Council, 439 U.S. at 1372-73.
91 Id. at 1372.
92 Id. at 1373.
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Thus, in Jones v. Wolf,93 it was unsurprising when five Justices
rejected the argument that "the First Amendment requires the States
to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in
resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal
controversy is involved."94 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun
expressly endorsed the idea that a state could choose any method of
settling a church property dispute provided the ultimate inquiry did
not involve any "'consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the rit-
ual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.'- 95 The neutral prin-
ciples of law approach at issue in the case (courts evaluated deeds and
statutes to determine who owned property) passed constitutional scru-
tiny because it did not require courts to examine religious doctrine. 96
The Court also suggested that the neutral principles approach had
practical advantages over Watson-style deference: "The primary advan-
tages of the neutral principles approach are that it is completely secu-
lar in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of
religious organization and polity.... It thereby promises to free civil
courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doc-
trine, polity, and practice. '97 The neutral principles approach also
promoted "flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to
reflect the intentions of the parties" because it allowed religious orga-
nizations to determine how disputes are settled via conventional com-
mon law means. 98
The majority recognized that the neutral principles approach was
not "wholly free of difficulty."99 In particular, courts could not pay
attention to "religious precepts" when they examined neutral lan-
guage.' 00 Furthermore, to the extent that religious documents incor-
porated religious concepts, "the court must defer to the resolution of
the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body" when inter-
preting religious documents) OT The four Justices who dissented in
Jones presciently predicted that the majority's decision probably would
require more entanglement into religious doctrine than before 0 2 and
93 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
94 Id. at 605.
95 Id. at 602 (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of
God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
96 Id. at 603.
97 Id. Of course, courts are still required to consider whether such entanglement
will occur before they can apply the neutral principles approach.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 604.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 611-14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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noted that the free exercise rights of the individuals associated with a
church would be harmed. 0 3 Instead, the Jones dissenters called for a
constitutional rule that would require churches to defer to the resolu-
tion of the dispute within the church itself.10 4 In rejecting the dis-
sent's deference-only position, the Jones majority thus presented states
with a clearly defined choice between the neutral principles approach
approved in Jones or the more deferential approach espoused in
Watson. 05
C. The Consequences of Using Neutral Principles
After Jones, courts rapidly adopted the "neutral principles" lan-
guage to conclude, in a variety of contexts far from the property dis-
putes that gave rise to the doctrine, that they could competently
analyze a variety of issues. For example, courts have applied the neu-
tral principles approach to hold churches liable in actions for inflic-
tion of emotional distress, 10 6 defamation,10 7 breach of fiduciary
duty,108 sexual abuse,10 9 negligent hiring, retention, and supervi-
103 Id. at 616.
104 Id. at 618.
105 Following Jones, most states decided to adopt, in church property disputes, the
neutral principles approach the five-Justice majority deemed constitutional. See, e.g.,
St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., 145 P.3d 541, 551-53 (Alaska 2006); Presbytery of Riverside
v. Cmty. Church of Palm Springs, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60 (Ct. App. 1979); York v.
First Presbyterian Church of Anna, 474 N.E.2d 716, 719-21 (II. 1984); Presbytery of
Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. Jaeggi, 682 S.W.2d 465, 467-69 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); First
Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church, 464 N.E.2d 454,
459-60 (N.Y. 1984); Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church,
489 A.2d 1317, 1319-23 (Pa. 1985); Foss v. Dykstra, 342 N.W.2d 220, 222 (S.D. 1983).
Others, however, chose to stay faithful to the deferential approach the four-Justice
dissent preferred. See Fonken v. Cmty. Church of Kamrar, 339 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa
1983); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 610 P.2d 182, 184 (Nev. 1980); Church of
God of Madison v. Noel, 318 S.E.2d 920, 923 (W. Va. 1984).
106 Calvary Christian Sch., Inc. v. Huffstuttler, No. 05-343, 2006 WL 1779525 (Ark.
June 29, 2006).
107 Id.; Berger v. Temple Beth-El of Great Neck, 756 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (App. Div.
2003).
108 Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); Fortin v.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208, 1225-27 (Me. 2005). But see
Wende C. v. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (App. Div. 2004) (find-
ing that the claim "cannot be resolved in accordance with neutral principles of law,
i.e., without any judicial inquiry into religious precepts"), aff'd, 827 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 346 (2005) (mem.).
109 Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493, 498-500 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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sion,1l° and breach of contract."' 1 The neutral principles approach
has not been limited to common law causes of action; courts have
concluded they are able to determine the propriety of garnishing
wages paid by a religious institution,' 1 2 the validity of applying unem-
ployment laws to religious organizations, 13 and the applicability of
civil rights laws" 4 and tax laws.115 In some cases, courts expressly
drew on statutory provisions to provide applicable "neutral princi-
110 Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of Church of the Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 353-55 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360-65 (Fla. 2002). But see Mulinix v.
Mulinix, No. C2-97-297, 1997 WL 585775, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1997) (hold-
ing that the plaintiffs claims "are fundamentally connected to issues of church gov-
ernance"); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) ("J]udicial
inquiry into hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of
religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination and retention of
clergy."); S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 178-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that
although the defendant's actions "may be secular in this case, that does not address
whether a civil court may avoid interpreting doctrine"); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d
434, 440-43 (Wis. 1997) (ruling that the court would have to interpret church law to
decide negligent supervision claim).
111 Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894
F.2d 1354, 1359-61 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808, 810-12 (Del.
Fam. Ct. 1992) (divorce settlement requiring husband to cooperate with wife in
obtaining a Jewish divorce involved neutral principles); Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County
v. Whale, 397 A.2d 712, 714 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) ("[Alrrangements
between a pastor and his congregation are matters of contract subject to enforcement
in the civil court."), affd, 432 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1981); Kapsalis v. Greek Orthodox Arch-
diocese of N. & S. Am., 714 N.Y.S.2d 902, 902 (App. Div. 2000); Rende & Esposito
Consultants, Inc. v. St. Augustine's Roman Catholic Church, 516 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-62
(App. Div. 1987) (seeking specific performance for breach of contract to sell prop-
erty). However, breach of contract claims cannot concern the employment relation-
ship if it involves a ministerial element. See Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian
Church, 55 Va. Cir. 480, 481-84 (Cir. Ct. 2000), afj'd, 553 S.E.2d 511 (Va. 2001); see
infra note 257 and accompanying text.
112 Rooney v. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). But see
Malichi v. Archdiocese of Miami, No. ID05-5108, 2006 WL 3207982, at *5 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2006) (declining to determine whether a priest is an employee for
purposes of receiving workman's compensation because of entanglement problems).
113 Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 56 P.3d 386, 392 (Or. 2002).
114 Sacred Heart Sch. Bd. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 460 N.W.2d 430,
432-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that church autonomy protection applied only
to religious-based discrimination and not other discriminatory reasons).
115 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 381, 462 (1984) (holding
that the consultation of church materials and practices to determine whether a relig-
ious organization qualified for a tax exemption constituted a proper application of
neutral principles of law), affd 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987).
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pies."1 16 In short, since Jones was decided, virtually every 
court to con-
sider the church autonomy defense outside of the 
context of church
property disputes has relied on Jones's neutral principles 
approach,
rather than Watson's deferential approach, to decide a case."
t7
Despite its popularity, courts have struggled to properly 
apply the
neutral principles approach. Jones suggests that 
under the church
autonomy doctrine, church autonomy can be 
restricted to some
extent. Some restrictions appear clearly 
unconstitutional; the
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that 
neutral principles can
only be applied if a court does not have to determine 
a question of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice.
1 18 But courts often toil to
resolve that threshold inquiry, and some even 
gloss over the issue
about whether the applicable principle is even 
neutral in the first
place.1 1 9 As previously mentioned, the Supreme 
Court approved the
neutral principles approach because it promised 
no unconstitutional
entanglement.1 2 0 Yet the Jones dissenters correctly 
pointed out that
determining whether a court can apply 
the neutral principles
approach on a case-by-case basis necessarily 
entails an entangling
inquiry into the religious group's organization 
or doctrinal
practices.121
116 Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493, 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that a statute
creating liability for sexual misconduct that occurs 
when one provides "advice, aid, or
comfort" could be applied to clergy members).
117 Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court's decision 
in Newport Church was unusual
in that it never defined the neutral principle it sought 
to apply. Instead, that court
concluded that the church autonomy doctrine did 
not survive Smith, and that the
unemployment law was one of neutral and general 
applicability. Newport Church, 56
P.3d at 392-93. Alternatively, under a compelling 
interest test, the court suggested
that the states' interest in providing unemployment 
benefits outweighed any inciden-
tal burden on a religious institution. Id. at 393-94.
118 Dane, supra note 32, at 1737-44.
119 See, e.g., Newport Church of Nazarene v. Hensley, 
56 P.3d 386, 392-93 (devot-
ing only one sentence to the neutrality analysis 
of an unemployment law). But see
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 
859 N.E.2d 459, 463-64 (N.Y.
2006) (spending nearly a full page discussing that a law mandating 
insurance cover-
age for contraceptives was neutral even though 
some religious activities were
exempted from the law and not others).
120 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) ("[Tlhe promise 
of nonentangle-
ment and neutrality inherent in the neutral principles 
approach more than compen-
sates for what will be occasional problems in application."); cf. Laycock, 
supra note 6,
at 1395 ("[T]he Court agreed unanimously on the goal 
of church autonomy. The
argument turned on whether the dissenters' approach 
would better implement the
decision of the church itself with less secular 
interference.").
121 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Two competing principles thus exist. Neutral principles are per-
missible only if no impermissible entanglement with church affairs
occurs. Yet as Watson said122 and numerous commentators illus-
trated,1 23 courts are ill-equipped to inquire into religious practices
and thus might be unable to determine when impermissible entangle-
ment has occurred. 124 Cases involving allegations of sexual assault by
clergy members for negligent supervision best illustrate judicial
incompetence to satisfactorily resolve this inquiry on a case-by-case
basis. Faced with similar disputes that asked courts to determine
whether a Roman Catholic bishop acted reasonably when supervising
a priest alleged to have committed an assault, the Florida Supreme
Court concluded no impermissible interference would occur125 while
the Missouri Supreme Court held the exact opposite.126
The Supreme Court exacerbates the difficulty of conducting case-
by-case inquiries by providing only a handful of examples of impermis-
sible intervention, none of which establish a clear guidepost for deter-
mining when this excessive entanglement has occurred. The Court's
church autonomy line of cases since Kedroff all involve the interpreta-
tion of church documents. Yet the vast majority of courts facing a
church autonomy defense are not called upon to interpret church
documents. Instead, they are asked to determine the constitutionality
of interference with religious organization, operation, and activity, an
issue upon which the Supreme Court has remained silent. In the pro-
cess of adjudicating church autonomy defenses on a case-by-case basis,
courts consistently demonstrate their incapability of inquiring into
religious practice and reaffirm the concerns the Watson Court origi-
nally expressed about having courts adjudicate religiously centered
disputes.
In light of the inherent difficulties of applying neutral principles
on a case-by-case basis, courts should adopt and rely upon a back-
ground principle that determines when they can adjudicate a relig-
ious dispute. Four possible outcomes emerge. At one extreme, some
scholars suggest courts should find that the First Amendment bars vir-
122 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
123 See Brady, supra note 32, at 1687.
124 Professor Brady identifies two potential problems when courts attempt to inter-
pret religious doctrine. First, "[c] onflicts between religious doctrine and secular law
may exist, but they may not be visible at the outset to either the church or the courts."
Id. Second, "courts may be stymied by multiple interpretations of church doctrine."
Id.
125 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360-61 (Fla. 2002); accord Roman Catholic
Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1226 (Miss. 2005).
126 Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-47 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
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tually any intrusion into the inner operation of church affairs.' 27 At
the other extreme, courts could conclude that neutral principles of
law can always be applied, and thus the First Amendment is never vio-
lated by regulating any aspect of a church. 28 Neither approach is
satisfactory when viewed in light of the Supreme Court's precedents.
First, the Supreme Court established in Jones that some intrusion into
the inner affairs of a church is permissible.1 29 Second, the Court's
church autonomy precedents, cited approvingly in Smith, establish
that some areas of church autonomy remain off-limits to government
regulations.130 The other two outcomes involve adopting a rebuttable
presumption that either favors or opposes the application of neutral
principles. Here, the choice of Jones- Watson-style deference or neu-
tral principles of law-lives on in another context. If a case-by-case
approach is unworkable, if absolute extremes are inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent, and if the Court has shifted toward
encouraging more judicial involvement while consistently protecting
some areas of autonomy, which way should the presumption operate?
II. THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY AND SMITH ON CHURCH AUTONOMY
A presumption that courts can constitutionally apply neutral prin-
ciples is preferable to either a case-by-case determination or a pre-
sumption against applying neutral principles of law. Two factors
guide the determination that courts should presume they are capable
of applying neutral principles of law: the historical attitudes toward
127 Brady, supra note 32, at 1698 ("[T]he only effective and workable protection
for the ability of religious groups to preserve, transmit, and develop their beliefs free
from government interference is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all
aspects of church affairs."); Laycock, supra note 6, at 1417 ("Any interference with the
autonomy of these organizations jeopardizes free exercise rights of their members,
including the free development of religious doctrine.").
128 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1216 ("'Church autonomy' is no doctrine at all but
rather a theory fundamentally at odds with the Constitution, its history, and the rule
of law it institutes."); cf. Underkuffler, supra note 32, at 1787 ("[G]ranting religious
groups sweeping freedom from civil laws carries with it far more costs than benefits.").
129 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979). Jones established that the appli-
cation of neutral principles was permissible precisely because the dispute did not
require a court to examine religious doctrine. However, as "church autonomy" is
used in this Note, the Court in Jones essentially resolved the dispute itself instead of
declining jurisdiction and granting the religious factions the autonomy to adjudicate
the dispute themselves.
130 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); see also infra notes
196-206 and accompanying text (reconciling the church autonomy precedents with
Smith).
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religious groups when the Bill of Rights was ratified"I and the Court's
reshaping of free exercise jurisprudence in Smith. However, because
of historical evidence that also establishes the value of autonomous
religious institutions and because the Court has definitively protected
some areas of church autonomy, churches can rely on these
predefined spheres of influence to rebut this presumption. 132
A. Historical Influences on the Church Autonomy Doctrine
Two strands of historical thought help influence modern under-
standing of the church autonomy doctrine. On one hand, shortly
after the Constitution's ratification, most believed that religious orga-
nizations and the government each had exclusive sovereignty over
separate spheres of public life.1 33 On the other hand, others feared
131 The use of history to analyze the Religion Clauses is a relatively recent develop-
ment. See generally Lee J. Strang, The (Re)turn to History in Religion Clause Law and
Scholarship, 81 NOTRE DAME L. Rrv. 1697 (2006) (summarizing the relatively recent
influence of historical materials on the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases). As
a result, there is a "seemingly irresistible impulse to appeal to history when analyzing
issues under the religion clauses," yet " It] his tendency is unfortunate because there is
no clear history as to the meaning of the clauses." JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 17.2, at 1411 (7th ed. 2004).
As Professor Laycock noted, "Church-state relations were a much contested issue
at the time of the American Founding, and those debates left an unusually thick
record. All sides in modem debates have mined that record, however selectively, for
evidence of original understanding." Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Relig-
ious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1793, 1793 (2006). The resulting approach often spirals into an exchange
where
One side cites Madison and Jefferson; the other side cites the defenders of
the established church .... At least in political and judicial debates, neither
side makes much effort to take account of the evidence offered by the other
side, or to craft a theory that explains why the Founders accepted govern-
ment support of religion in some contexts and not in others....
The use of history has been selective not just in the sense that each side
prefers its own half of history, but also in the sense that some prominent
history is invoked repeatedly, and other history, less widely known, is largely
ignored.
Id. at 1793-94. To avoid falling into this trap, this Note's brief foray into differing
historical attitudes toward church autonomy seeks only to present competing perspec-
tives for the purpose of providing a simple overview to promote a holistic understand-
ing of the relevant historical materials.
132 See infra Part IHI.
133 Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1393 ("IT]he American solution to the church-state
problem was to deny to the civil government its prior authority over inherently relig-
ious questions, thus leaving such matters within the sole province of the church.").
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the harmful effects of religious groups when supported by govern-
ment power.' 3 4 When pulled together, both strands support the idea
that certain spheres of religious life enjoyed some, but not complete,
immunity from government action.
Professor Carl Esbeck's exhaustive analysis of how organized
religion and government have coexisted reveals that Americans trans-
planted from Europe brought the idea that religious institutions and
governments enjoyed "dual authority" over public life.' 35 Yet Ameri-
cans differed from their European counterparts because, after the
Founding, they gradually declined to prop up religious institutions.'3 6
The "conventional wisdom" of the time held that "the existence of
healthy religious institutions was essential to the health of the state,
and that the existence of healthy religious institutions depended on
the support and protection of the state."'1 7 By contrast, "state estab-
lishment of religion had exactly the opposite effect." 138
Under a process Esbeck calls "disestablishment," states withdrew
from regulating religious affairs independently of the Establishment
Clause, because establishment efforts had the destabilizing effect of
"corrupting religion, the clergy, and the church."' 39 In Esbeck's view,
the dual-authority approach created "coexisting governmental and
religious institutions, the former with authority over the civil and the
latter having its province over the spiritual."1 40 Since the Supreme
Court constitutionalized some protections for religious institutions in
Kedroff' 4' Esbeck argues that "a free church and a limited state has
proven best for religion and best for civil government.' ' 42
Yet this separation was not absolute. At the time of the Founding,
the Framers conclusively believed in a broad right to complete free-
dom of belief' 43 but were more wary about the freedom to act.144 In
134 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1154-56.
135 Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1589.
136 Id. at 1573.
137 Id. at 1573-74.
138 Id. at 1574.
139 Id. at 1590.
140 Id. at 1589.
141 Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-21 (1952).
142 Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1592.
143 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13
THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 440, 442-43 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1956);James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 8
THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
144 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 143, at 442 ("The declaration
that religious faith shall be unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts dic-
tated by religious error.").
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particular, the Establishment Clause is an example of the founding
generation's fear of a religious entity backed by the power of the gov-
ernment.1 45 Indeed, the underlying political philosophy of the time
(often associated with John Locke) regarded religious liberty as a
right to do "what was not lawfully prohibited." I 46 The importance of
church autonomy was of little concern to nineteenth-century govern-
ment officials who sought to weaken the Roman Catholic Church by
targeting its internal affairs. 147 Instead of embracing a broad view of
protecting religious entities, the Framers were fearful of the effects of
religion. 148 Even James Madison, the drafter of the First Amendment,
worried at the end of his tenure that "'[t]he danger of silent accumu-
lations & encroachments by Ecclesiastical Bodies have not sufficiently
engaged attention in the U.S.' "149
For this latter group of Framers, the excesses of religious domi-
nance in Europe, including the Inquisitions, the wars between Catho-
lic and Protestant countries, and years of religious-based executions
counseled against extending broad protection to the activities of relig-
ious institutions. 15 0 Yet as Esbeck forcefully shows, they coexisted with
other groups who firmly believed religious institutions-and therefore
society-benefited when government avoided entangling itself with
organized religions. Any sound articulation of the church autonomy
doctrine must therefore incorporate both attitudes.
B. Lessons from Smith
The First Amendment principles announced in Smith also shed
light on the direction in which the background presumption should
operate. Smith has value in the church autonomy context, even
though the decision concerned the applicability of a statute to individ-
ual conduct, because of the sweeping implications of the opinion's
145 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1145.
146 Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 624 (1990); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 539 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihe most plausible reading" of early laws
purporting to protect religion "is a virtual restatement of Smith: Religious exercise
shall be permitted so long as it does not violate general laws governing conduct.")
147 Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATHOLIC Soc. THOUGHT 59,
77 (2007); see also Philip Hamburger, Illiberal Liberalism: Liberal Theology, Anti-Catholi-
cism, & Church Property, 12J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 693, 708-10 (2002).
148 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1152.
149 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 98 (1986) (quoting James
Madison, Detached Memoranda, in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda,"
3 Wm. & MARY Q. 534, 554 (1946)).
150 Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1154-56.
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Free Exercise jurisprudence.' 
5 Indeed, for many commentators
'5 2
and courts, I51 Smith "provides the most relevant 
guidance when neu-
tral government regulation impacts the internal 
affairs of religious
groups."'15
4
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that neutral, 
generally applica-
ble laws that incidentally burden an individual's 
free exercise of relig-
ion do not violate the First Amendment.
55 The Court declined to
apply the compelling interest test articulated 
in Sherbert v. Verner 
56 for
three primary reasons. First, the compelling 
interest test is a "constitu-
tional anomaly" because it creates a private 
right to ignore generally
applicable laws, whereas applications of the 
compelling interest test in
conjunction with other constitutional provisions (such 
as the Speech
Clause) are constitutional norms.
15 7 Second, courts cannot apply the
compelling interest test even in instances 
where the regulated con-
duct is "central" to an individual's religion because 
"' [i] t is not within
the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs 
or prac-
tices to a faith, or the validity of particular 
litigants' interpretations of
those creef s. Notably, the Court cited 
Presbyterian and Jones to
support its proposition that courts should not 
"presume to determine
the place of a particular belief in a religion 
or the plausibility of a
religious claim."' 5
9 Finally, the Court noted that applying the 
compel-
ling interest test in every instance effectively 
creates a presumption
that favors invalidating a regulation because 
of the diversity of relig-
ious beliefs-an unacceptable result that would 
"open the prospect of
151 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
874 (1990).
152 See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntaiy Principle 
and Church Autonomy, Then and Now,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1606 (noting that Smith "has significantly 
limited free exercise
claims and thus has posed a threat to the existence 
of a constitutional right of auton-
omy for religious communities"); Brady, supra note 32, 
at 1671-1714; Joanne C.
Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious 
Employers and a Constitutional Right to
Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 276-77 (1994); Hamilton, 
supra note 39,
at 1193-96.
153 See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese 
of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656-57
(10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that "the church autonomy 
doctrine remains viable
after Smith" because the doctrine "addresses 
the rights of the church, not the fights of
individuals").
154 Brady, supra note 32, at 1649.
155 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
156 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
157 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
158 Id. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 
490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).
159 Id,; see also id. at 877 ("The government may 
not. . .lend its power to one or
the other side in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma.").
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constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations
of almost every conceivable kind."160
At first glance, Smith appears to provide little guidance in apply-
ing the church autonomy doctrine. The Court said nothing about the
extent to which generally applicable laws may place incidental bur-
dens on the conduct of religious organizations. But the Court did
appear to preserve the church autonomy doctrine in some form by
noting that "it]he government may not... lend its power to one or
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma. 1' 61
Accordingly, some area of church autonomy remains immune to gov-
ernment regulation; the Court apparently left it to the lower courts to
figure outjust how much internal activity is off-limits and how to effec-
tively apply neutral principles.
Yet upon closer examination, the Smith decision provides several
principles to help courts effectively apply the church autonomy doc-
trine to church action. First, six Justices in Smith echo Watson in not-
ing the problems inherent in asking courts to determine the centrality
of a particular religious belief.162 In one view, the church autonomy
doctrine essentially protects from unconstitutional government inter-
ference matters that are "purely spiritual"163 or fall within the "spiri-
tual epicenter" of a church.1 64 Activities that lie outside this spiritual
epicenter can be regulated in proportion to their secularity.165 Such
160 Id. at 888-89 (listing examples of exemptions).
161 Id. at 877 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-25 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969); Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94, 95-119 (1952)).
162 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87; id. at 906-07 (O'Connorj, concurring) ("[Olur
determination of the constitutionality of Oregon's general criminal prohibition can-
not, and should not, turn on the centrality of the particular religious practice at
issue.").
163 A South Carolina court of equity was the first American court to use this phrase
in a published opinion. See Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87, 131-32
(1843) (holding that the "power of the church is purely spiritual" and cannot impose
civil sanctions). Later courts have struck down laws that purport to define religious
activity as that which is "purely spiritual." See Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 480
(10th Cir. 1980), affd, 456 U.S. 951 (1982); cf Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v.
Walsh, 770 A.2d 111, 122 (Md. 2001) (declaring a statute containing the phrase
"purely religious functions" unconstitutional).
164 Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. Rwv. 1514, 1539 (1979). Among
the categories that Bagni considers within the spiritual epicenter are the relationship
between a church and a minister, membership policies, religious education, worship,
and ritual. Id.
165 See id. at 1540.
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an inquiry, however, effectively requires courts to "determine the
place of a particular belief in a religion" t66-- something both Presbyte-
rian and Jones say is impermissible. 167 If a court is to apply the church
autonomy doctrine, it cannot consider "how secular" an activity is, for
that establishes the very balancing test the doctrine purports to reject.
The fact that religion is implicated in any context is sufficient to raise
First Amendment concerns.168 But by adopting a presumption which
assumes government action will not intrude on "purely spiritual"
areas, courts create problematic and unworkable secular-religious dis-
tinctions. The Smith Court concluded it needed to draw a clearly
defined rule to avoid troublesome case-by-case inquiries. 169
The question for the Smith Court, and the question courts facing
a church autonomy defenses must address, is how courts should con-
struct such a rule. Is every regulation that burdens institutional auton-
omy presumptively invalid, or do the problems associated with carving
out piecemeal exceptions necessitate imposing some generally appli-
cable standard in spite of those burdens? In a sense, this question is
analogous to the choice presented by Jones-are courts required to
defer to the decisions of church administrators, or can they overrule
those decisions if neutral principles of law can be applied?170 The
Smith Court ultimately concluded that when faced with the danger of
proliferating religious-based exemptions, courts should leave deci-
sions about the creation of such exemptions to the political pro-
cess. 17 1 As the Court said: " [T ] o say that a nondiscriminatory religious
practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to
say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occa-
sions for its creation can be discerned by the courts."' 7 2
The same principle applies to religious group autonomy. The
Supreme Court concluded that incidental burdens on church auton-
omy, just like incidental burdens on individual religious conduct,
166 Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (majority opinion).
167 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Eliza-
beth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-52 (1969).
168 Nussbaum, supra note 43.
169 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-89.
170 Cf Berg, supra note 152, at 1611-12 (describing one way of viewing Jones that
finds its approval of neutral principles to be a precedent "for the Smith ruling that a
neutral, generally applicable law satisfies the Free Exercise Clause no matter how seri-
ous a restriction it imposes on religious practice").
171 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("[A] society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legisla-
tion as well.").
172 Id. (emphasis added).
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could be justified in certain instances. 173 When faced with a decision
to proceed with a case-by-case approach or adopt a broad principle,
the Smith Court chose to adopt a broad principle that favored con-
cluding that incidental burdens on individual conduct caused by neu-
tral, generally applicable laws are constitutional.1 74 Although the
Supreme Court has not explicitly taken a similar step in the church
autonomy doctrine, Smith implies that a presumption that favors
greater application of neutral principles of law would align the doc-
trine to existing First Amendment jurisprudence and result in prag-
matic benefits.
Admittedly, "neutral principles of law" are not the same as "neu-
tral laws of general applicability." However, the Supreme Court has
defined a neutral law as one that does not "target[ ] religious beliefs
as such" or have as its "object ... to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation." 175 Although there is no analo-
gous definition for "neutral principles of law," in the church auton-
omy context, some courts have used the terms "neutral principles of
law" and "neutral laws" interchangeably. 176 However, the original
concept of "neutral principles of law" developed in the context of
property disputes, where principles for interpreting written docu-
ments had been well established. As later courts properly noted, neu-
tral principles of law can also be well-established principles espoused
in contract 1 7 7 and tort 78 actions or supplied by statute. 179 Nothing in
the Supreme Court's case law indicates that, for the purposes of the
church autonomy doctrine, neutral and generally applicable laws can-
173 See id. at 878. In the church autonomy context, incidental burdens can be
imposed unless the process of imposing those burdens interferes with matters of faith,
doctrine, church governance, and polity. See infra Part III. The class of incidental
burdens that could be imposed on individual religious conduct was much smaller;
such burdens were constitutional only if they were justified by a compelling govern-
ment interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
174 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 ("[Wle cannot afford the luxury of deeming presump-
tively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that
does not protect an interest of the highest order.").
175 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993).
176 See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) ("The 'neu-
tral principles' doctrine ... allows a court to apply the neutral laws of the state to
religious organizations but forbids a court from resolving disputed issues of religious
doctrine and practice.").
177 See, e.g., Rende & Esposito Consultants, Inc. v. St. Augustine's Roman Catholic
Church, 516 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-62 (App. Div. 1987).
178 See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 364 (Fla. 2002).
179 See, e.g., Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1970) (per curiam).
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not supply the applicable neutral principle of 
law. By definition, neu-
tral principles of law neither target religious 
beliefs nor restrict
practices for religious-based reasons. 
In fact, Kedroff although
decided nearly forty years before the Supreme 
Court supplied a defi-
nition of a religiously neutral law, provides 
an example of a decidedly
nonneutral state law.
180 Accordingly, for the purposes of the church
autonomy doctrine, the terms "neutral principles 
of law" and "neutral
laws of general applicability" have no practical 
difference.
Some commentators have argued for an opposite 
approach,
where courts adopt a Watson-style deferential 
approach if a church
claims that the civil court resolution of 
a religious controversy would
involve impermissible infringement on 
church autonomy. Support
for this view is drawn from language in 
Watson which suggests that
"religious liberty [is protected] from the invasion of the civil author-
ity." 1  As applied by some courts, any decision 
that requires a court
to evaluate the reasonableness of a religious 
organization's conduct
necessarily requires an impermissible evaluation 
of religious doc-
trine.18 2 Two problems exist with this 
approach. First, religious
groups may not even know when they 
submit to secular jurisdiction
whether an impermissible intrusion might 
occur.
18 3 Thus, the right of
a church to claim the autonomy defense 
would depend on its ability
to properly recognize the interference 
of generally applicable laws
with church doctrine. Second, allowing 
a religious organization to
determine when the application of "neutral 
principles" avoids inter-
fering with religious autonomy effectively 
grants it the power to deter-
mine when it can be sued.
1 8 4 This kind of presumption operates
contrary to the well established doctrine 
that religious entities are free
to believe what they want, but limits are 
imposed on their ability to
act.1 85
180 See id. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring); Kedroff 
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 98 n.2, 99 n.3 (1952).
181 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 
(1871).
182 See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 
239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
183 See Brady, supra note 32, at 1687.
184 Cf. Roman Catholic Diocese ofJackson 
v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1229-30
(Miss. 2005) ("For this Court to agree with the Diocese 
would require us to conclude
that ecclesiastical principles could reasonably 
impose or suggest different require-
ments for the protection of children from 
sexual molestation than the requirements
generally imposed by society.").
185 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[T]he [First]
Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom 
to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, 
the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society."); 
see also Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("Under our established
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For some, those problems actually counsel in favor of granting
broad constitutional protection for church autonomy. Under this
view, most recently espoused by Professor Kathleen Brady, the princi-
ples in Smith, although they facially eliminate religious exemptions,
actually stand for a broader protection of religion. 1 6 Concededly,
while Smith does support the constitutionality of a presumption favor-
ing the application of neutral principles, it also approvingly cites
existing church autonomy precedents and therefore suggests neutral
principles of law cannot override some aspects of church autonomy.
As Brady suggests, Smith said nothing about infringing the freedom to
believe, only the freedom to act, and religious organizations play a
fundamental role in cultivating religious doctrine.'8 7 Because "[flull
freedom of belief is not possible without a corresponding right of
religious groups to teach, develop, and practice their doctrines and
ideas . .. s]pecial protections for religious organizations are neces-
sary at least where government regulation interferes with religious
belief or practice," ' and this framework incorporates sufficient
protections.
But it goes too far to say, as Professor Brady does, that because
courts cannot adequately define the relationship between religious
practices and nonreligious practices, churches should enjoy a "broad
right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church
affairs." 1 9 Brady argues that individual religious beliefs enjoy consid-
erable protection, that those beliefs are often fostered by a religious
organization, and that an organization often creates and expresses its
beliefs via a variety of religious practices.1 90 Yet Professor Brady's
forceful claim dances around the dangerous potential of religiously
motivated conduct, the chief concern the Smith Court sought to
address. "Religion, when 'combined' in groups and institutions,
wields tremendous social, economic, and political power."191 In some
cases, this power can be used for harmful purposes;' 92 in others, it can
be used for beneficial purposes.1 93 To the extent that broad protec-
First Amendment jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to act, unlike
the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute.").
186 See Brady, supra note 32, at 1636 ("When read carefully, Smith supports a broad
right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church affairs ...
187 See id. at 1676.
188 Id. at 1677.
189 Id. at 1698.
190 See id. at 1675-77.
191 Underkuffler, supra note 32, at 1786.
192 See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
193 In Professor Brady's view, religious groups are "buffers against overweening
state power," "enhance individual autonomy," "provide a realm of privacy, intimacy,
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tion for religious autonomy benefits society or that religious institu-
tions can regulate themselves, as many suggest, 
194 Smith definitively
established that legislatures should assume responsibility 
for safe-
guarding religiously motivated conduct. In this context, 
organizations
should enjoy no more special protection than individuals. "With 
the
religious strife and oppression that currently engulfs 
vast parts of the
world, the view that religious groups should be simply 
left alone to do
good works seems alarmingly inadequate."
19 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith thus 
directs courts to
ignore the burden on religious activity and focus 
on the neutrality of
the principle of law. Accordingly, in the church autonomy 
context,
courts should generally ignore the burden on 
church autonomy and
focus on the neutrality of the law. If the principle 
supplied by the law
is neutral, a court should presume no impermissible 
interference with
religion will occur.
This conclusion clashes with the notion, provided 
by the Watson
line of cases, that at least some areas of institutional 
autonomy are
entitled to constitutional safeguards. The principles 
in Smith strongly
indicate at least that the scope of constitutionally 
protected church
autonomy has narrowed. Still, two questions remain 
unanswered. Did
Smith completely eradicate the Watson line of cases, 
such that no areas
of church autonomy now deserve constitutional 
protection? If not,
how should courts draw judicially manageable lines so they 
can con-
sistently determine the spheres of church autonomy 
with which the
government may not constitutionally interfere?
III. THREE SPHERES OF CHuRcH AUTONOMY
The most natural question after Smith concerns 
whether the
Court left any room for religious autonomy, and 
if so, how the church
autonomy doctrine squares with Smith's attack 
on religious-based
exemptions because they are "constitutional 
anomalies."'196  Smith
effectively directed courts to look at the neutrality 
of the law, not the
and supportive social bonds," "address[ ] spiritual matters 
that lie beyond the tempo-
ral concerns of government," and "have much 
to say about the shape of the temporal
order." Brady, supra note 32, at 1703-04; see also 
id. at 1703-04 nn.403-
06 (collecting
articles that also express these views).
194 Cf Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REv. 
461, 565 (2005)
("[T]he Court's treatment of religion has traveled from a 
substantive concern with the
distinctive role of religious groups and practices to 
a less protective, but more gener-
ally applicable, fact-intensive focus on formal neutrality.").
195 Underkuffler, supra note 32, at 1786.
196 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 886 (1990).
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burden on religious conduct.
197 But Smith also explicitly left room for
specific, albeit narrowly defined, areas of church autonomy.
198
These seemingly conflicting principles can be reconciled 
by
understanding that unlike an individually granted 
religious exemp-
tion from the law, the church autonomy doctrine 
is not a constitu-
tional anomaly. Smith called religious-based exemptions 
to generally
applicable laws constitutional anomalies in 
the sense that they
demand a private right to ignore the law instead 
of defining general
limits on the reach of law.
199 By contrast, the doctrine of church
autonomy focuses on defining boundaries where 
courts and legisla-
tures cannot interfere, not on carving exemptions 
on a case-by-case
basis.200
Professor Perry Dane provides two reasons why 
church autonomy
does not suffer from the same problems as individual 
religious exemp-
tions. First, the church autonomy doctrine 
"provides the standard
against which various legal regimes can be found 
objectively sufficient
or defective" and "invites and requires exactly the 
same sort of bound-
ary questions, and answers to those questions, 
that we find in free
speech and other constitutional doctrines."
20
' Second, the church
autonomy doctrine, unlike an individual 
based exemption that
depends on a purported religious belief, attaches 
to religious institu-
tions simply because they are religious institutions 
and not because of
the beliefs those institutions claim 
to protect.20 2
The church autonomy doctrine thus avoids being 
labeled a Smith
constitutional anomaly to the extent that it seeks 
to establish bounda-
ries on the applicability of various laws to religious 
organizations irre-
197 See id. at 878-80; see also Gabrielle Giselle Davison, 
Note, The "Extreme and Hypo-
thetical" Come to Life: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 43
CATii. U. L. Rxv. 641, 659 (1994) ("As long as the state remains 
neutral in enacting
generally applicable laws, it has no obligation to 
prevent whatever incidental burdens
those laws may place on religious conduct.").
198 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
199 Dane, supra note 32, at 1730. Professor Dane 
points to a "parade of horribles"
cited in Smith as evidence of the litany of cases 
where exemptions from the law, not
tests on the definition of some constitutional boundary, 
are problematic and there-
fore the source of constitutional anomalies. See 
id. at 1729.
200 See id. at 1732-36. In Professor Dane's 
view, religious group autonomy doc-
trines are constitutional so long as they are discrete, 
defined, predictable, and apply
to religious communities generally. Id. at 1735-36.
201 Id. at 1734; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86 
(calling the application of the
Equal Protection Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
constitutional norms because they
produce "equality of treatment and an unrestricted 
flow of contending speech" and
not "a private right to ignore generally applicable 
laws").
202 Dane, supra note 32, at 1734.
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spective of individual religious beliefs. Furthermore, as Esbeck
shows, 20 3 creating spheres of autonomy over which religious institu-
tions enjoy exclusive dominion is consistent with historical attitudes
toward religious institutions shortly after the ratification of the Bill of
Rights. 20 4
It seems hypocritical to criticize the current application of the
church autonomy doctrine for its arbitrary and inconsistent applica-
tion by proposing a general principle, and then carve out exceptions
to that principle that some might argue would lead to equally incon-
sistent application. However, this approach best reconciles Smith with
the existing church autonomy precedents. When viewed in light of
Smith, the church autonomy precedents stand for the idea that courts
can craft at least three exemptions from the general rule that they can
constitutionally adjudicate a dispute involving neutral principles of
law.205
203 See Esbeck, supra note 9, at 1589 ("For seventeen centuries now these two cen-
ters of authority have at times competed and at times cooperated. While the exact
boundaries between the two remain conflicted, it is understood that although the
respective jurisdictions overlap at many points, nevertheless there are subject matters
over which the state has sovereign power and subject matters over which the church
has exclusive authority.").
204 Brady argues that any attempt to define "a set of activities that are inherently or
quintessentially religious" is futile. Brady, supra note 32, at 1690. She argues that
when government officials, including judges, address religious questions in areas dif-
ferent from their own faith traditions, two problems erupt. First, "aspects of church
life which are uniquely or quintessentially religious are not obvious." Id. Second,
"the aspects of church administration that are quintessentially religious differ from
group to group." Id. at 1692.
Brady's solution to this problem is to extend broad constitutional protection to
any internal activity of a church. But her approach runs opposite to the Supreme
Court's view espoused in Smith. Rather than extend broad constitutional protection
to individual free exercise claims, the Court left decisions to grant religious exemp-
tions in the hands of legislatures. This Note follows the Court's position by narrowly
defining the scope of constitutional protection, allowing judges to decide when relig-
ious group activity falls into areas of protection already identified by the Supreme
Court instead of creating new constitutional boundaries, and encouraging legislative
bodies to provide additional protection for areas of institutional autonomy that the
church autonomy doctrine does not protect with a constitutional rule. See infra notes
280-98 and accompanying text.
205 The three exemptions from this generally applicable rule are a church's free-
dom to define and interpret its own religious doctrine, see infra Part III.A, a church's
freedom to determine its own organizational structure, see infra Part IllB, and a
church's freedom to govern the relationship with its ministers, see infra Part III.C. Cf
Dane, supra note 32, at 1730-36 (suggesting that the church autonomy doctrine is
consistent with Smith insofar as it avoids created case-by-case exemptions from gener-
ally applicable laws).
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The Supreme Court has explicitly defined two spheres of church
autonomy, one that involves a church's freedom to determine and
interpret its religious doctrine and another that protects a church's
power to organize its internal structure. Lower courts, drawing on
inferences from Supreme Court precedent, uniformly embrace a
third sphere, albeit in different degrees, governing the relationship
between a minister and a church. If a court presumes that it can con-
stitutionally apply the neutral principles approach, a religious group
could rebut that presumption by showing that the government action
involves intrusion into one of these three spheres of protected
activity.
20 6
A. Power over Doctrine
The first sphere of religious group autonomy prohibits courts
from defining or interpreting religious doctrine and adjudicating
religious controversies between different factions of a church. Such
an approach is proper, the Supreme Court has said, because "[i]t is
not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as compe-
tent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as
the ablest men in each are in reference to their own."20 7
The Court emphasized this principle in Milivojevich when it
rebuked the Illinois Supreme Court for its chosen approach for resolv-
ing a church controversy. The Illinois Supreme Court purported to
apply "neutral principles" to determine whether the Serbian Ortho-
dox Church had the power under its constitution to divide the Ameri-
can-Canadian Diocese into three Dioceses.208 The state court made its
determination by concluding that the early history of the American-
Canadian Diocese "manifested a clear intention to retain indepen-
206 These spheres ultimately overlap to some extent. For example, a decision to
hire and fire a minister involves the church's authority over its internal structure. See
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717 (1976). Such a deci-
sion also involves its power to define its own doctrine through the minister. See
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The minister is the
chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose."). But cf. infra note
237 (discussing how courts can nevertheless consult written church documents if the
process does not require interpreting religious doctrine).
Others might say that these are not spheres of constitutionally protected auton-
omy. Instead, they might point out that the Supreme Court has said any infringement
with church autonomy is unconstitutional. The chief difference between these posi-
tions is that this Note defines the phrase "church autonomy" broadly, while other
commentators have defined the phrase "church autonomy" narrowly to include what
this Note calls constitutionally protected autonomy.
207 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
208 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 707-08.
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dence and autonomy" while becoming "ecclesiastically 
and judicially
an organic part of the Serbian Orthodox Church."
20 9 The court inter-
preted the constitutions of the American-Canadian 
and Serbian
Orthodox Church constitutions to support its historical 
determina-
tion.2 10 The Supreme Court called the Illinois 
court's approach
unconstitutional because it "substituted its interpretation 
of the ...
[church] constitutions for that of the highest ecclesiastical 
tribunals
in which church law vests authority 
to make that interpretation."
21
'
The Court expressly rejected the purported application of 
neutral
principles of law in this context because it involved 
an impermissible
interpretation of religious law.
2 12 In the end, the dispute hinged on
whether the religious documents were sufficiently 
clear. Because the
Supreme Court believed they were not, the 
Illinois Supreme Court
erred because it resolved a religious controversy 
by rejecting the
church's interpretation of its own 
religious materials.
215
As a general principle, this class of religious 
disputes often arises
in one of two ways. First, a legislature might 
pass a law mandating the
method by which a religious organization must 
(or must not) wor-
ship.2 14 The Supreme Court has emphatically 
rejected the power of a
legislative body to define the procedures by which 
a church can wor-
ship,215 and the handful of opinions that present 
evidence of such
cases indicate that churches enjoy considerable success defending 
this
sphere of autonomy.
2 16 Accordingly, when a government entity
attempts to define how a church may worship, 
the church's internal
affairs are protected by the church autonomy 
doctrine.
Second, a party may challenge a church's power 
to act a certain
way by referring to religious documents. If the 
documents are not "so
express that the civil courts could enforce them 
without engaging in a
209 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268, 
283 (Il. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 696.
210 See id. at 282-84.
211 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721.
212 See id. at 722-24. Then-Justice Rehnquist believed, 
however, that there was no
difference between the case at hand and the religious 
provisions at issue in Maryland
& Virginia Eldership. Id. at 734 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
see supra note 89.
213 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721.
214 See, e.g., Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher 
Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337,
1341-46 (4th Cir. 1995); Ran-Day's County Kosher, 
Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353,
1363-65 (N.J. 1992) (state law regulating products sold 
as kosher unconstitutionally
defined Jewish doctrine regarding what constituted 
kosher).
215 See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 
344 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952).
216 Cf, e.g., Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1340-46 (striking down 
state law because it vio-
lated the Establishment Clause). Such a result is generally 
unsurprising, because
these laws are almost always specifically targeted 
at religious activity.
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searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity,"
then the court must decline to hear the dispute.217 Otherwise, a court
violates Milivojevich by interpreting the religious documents at issue.
Thus, when a court attempts to interpret a religious precept, and the
court's interpretation of that religious tenet differs from the interpre-
tation proffered by the church, the church autonomy doctrine pro-
tects the religious organization's interpretation.
Courts have frequently found that they lack jurisdiction when the
dispute involves different factions of a religious organization.218 By
contrast, when a dispute involves a religious organization and a nonaf-
filiated party, courts regularly declare they do not have to resolve a
religious controversy to adjudicate the dispute.2 19 Here, an important
distinction must be drawn between religious doctrine and religious
motives. Religious doctrine is often implicated when a party asks a
court to determine what a religious provision means. Unless that
religious provision is express, courts may not interpret the provision
and must refrain from exercising jurisdiction. 220 However, religious
motives describe religious-based reasons for acting a certain way; in
this case, courts can usually constitutionally adjudicate the dispute.
Consider a hypothetical situation involving a church opposed to
abortion that decides to lease land for an abortion clinic. A faction of
the church's supporters file suit seeking an injunction because the
church's religious law prevents it from leasing its land to abortion sup-
porters. Unless the faction's argument relies upon a provision suffi-
ciently clear to enable the court to resolve the dispute without
interpreting the provision (and by extension, religious doctrine), the
court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute and
instead defer to the position advocated by the highest church
authority.2 21
Now suppose that the church decides to break its agreement to
lease the land and the abortion clinic files suit alleging a breach of
contract. As a defense, the church argues that performance is imprac-
tical because its religious laws forbid leasing land to abortion provid-
ers. While the church has a religious motive for breaching its
217 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723. Of course, what constitutes "express" is hard to
determine. See id. at 734 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218 See, e.g., id. at 715-16 (majority opinion); Kedroff 344 U.S. at 114-17; Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34 (1871).
219 Cf supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (explaining how courts readily
adjudicate contract and tort disputes involving churches and nonaffiliated parties).
220 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723.
221 See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text (explaining the methods by
which courts determine what faction is the church's highest authority).
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contract, courts can still apply neutral principles of law to adjudicate
the dispute. Under the presumption adopted in Part 11, a court
should conclude it can decide the merits of the case because it will not
unconstitutionally interfere in church autonomy. Because religious
motives-and not religious doctrine-are at issue, a court should treat
the religious-based justification for failing to honor the contract the
same as an economic-based reason.2 22
B. Power over Structure
Church structure disputes involve the power of a church to deter-
mine its own organizational structure as well as determine who within
the church has ultimate decisionmaking power to resolve certain
religious controversies. Support for a church's freedom to determine
its own structure comes directly from Kedroff and Milivojevich. The
Court in Kedroff struck down a state statute declaring what faction had
control over a Russian church's property.2 2 3 Religious freedom, the
Court said, includes the "power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government ..... 224 Nor can
judges broadly declare which faction of a church has power to make
decisions; the role of courts in such disputes is carefully prescribed by
the Supreme Court.2 25 Likewise, in Milivojevich, the Court declined to
exercise jurisdiction over a challenge to a restructuring of the Serbian
Orthodox Church, holding that "the reorganization of the Diocese
222 Cf Rende & Esposito Consultants, Inc. v. St. Augustine's Roman Catholic
Church, 516 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-62 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that disputes involving a
title to real property in a case where a church's board of trustees failed to approve the
a contract previously signed with a developer could be settled by applying neutral
principles of law).
223 Kedroff 344 U.S. at 110.
224 Id. at 116.
225 See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 190-91 (1960) (per
curiam); infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text. After the Court handed down its
decision in Kedroff the New York Court of Appeals remanded the case to consider a
common law issue not addressed by the Court's Kedroff opinion, which was decided
on statutory grounds. Kreshik, 363 U.S. at 191. Following trial, the Court of Appeals
entered judgment in favor of the petitioners and awarded them control over the
church property. See id. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "the decision now
under review rests on the same premises which were found to have underlain the
enactment of the statute struck down in Kedroff and that "it is established doctrine
that '[i]t is not of moment that the State has here acted solely through its judicial
branch, for whether legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power
which we are asked to scrutinize.'" Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958)).
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involves a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core
of ecclesiastical affairs." 226
This sphere of autonomy produces the greatest confusion. Does
control over church "government" and "authority" include control
over all aspects of the internal affairs of a church? Or does it include
exclusive control only over some limited aspects, with the government
possessing the power to regulate the rest? While the Supreme Court
has not expressly ruled on the extent of this protection, lower courts
generally conclude that the internal decisionmaking power of a
church can be infringed upon by statute only if the intrusion does not
affect the structure of the church.
For example, in Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio,22 7
several religious organizations protested the application of a neutral,
generally applicable law that required them to provide insurance cov-
erage for contraceptives.2 28 The organizations objected to financing
what they believed was sinful activity. 229 On one hand, the application
of the law clearly had an effect on organizational governance-it
effectively forced the religious organizations to compensate their
employees in a specified manner. 230 On the other hand, as the New
York Court of Appeals ultimately concluded, the law "merely regulates
one aspect of the relationship between plaintiffs and their
employees." 231
The Supreme Court's previous jurisprudence is instrumental in
understanding that the Catholic Charities court properly applied the
church autonomy doctrine. The language in Supreme Court cases
concerns "religious controversies" 32 and issues of "authority."233
Unlike Watson, Kedroff and Milivojevich, where the dispute concerned
who had decisionmaking power within a religious organization, Catho-
lic Charities involved a question of whether the church had religious
autonomy. The distinction is extremely significant. A dispute of the
kind seen in Watson is a quintessential structural dispute between fac-
tions of a religious organization over the power to make decisions on
226 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976).
227 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).
228 Id. at 461.
229 Id. at 463.
230 See id. at 461.
231 Id. at 465.
232 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 608 (1979); Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. v. Cal.
Super. Ct., 439 U.S. 1369, 1373 (1978) (Rehnquist, CircuitJ,); Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976).
233 Jones, 443 U.S. at 605; Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 106 (1952).
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behalf of that organization. By contrast, the church 
has no power to
say its authority over internal affairs is burdened by the 
application of
a neutral law.2 3 4 Such power effectively creates 
religious-based exemp-
tions in the organizational context when 
those exemptions are anom-
alous in the individual context. The application 
of a neutral law of
general applicability will almost never interfere 
with church authority
under this sphere of the church 
autonomy doctrine.
235
If, however, a court concludes that the application 
of a neutral
principle of law would effectively alter 
the structure of a religious
organization, it can only exercise limited 
jurisdiction for the sole pur-
pose of determining to what faction a court 
should defer. Watson asks
courts to distinguish between hierarchical 
and congregational
churches. 23 6 Such deference is appropriate, 
Watson says, because par-
ties that exercise the right to associate and 
form a religious organiza-
tion implicitly agree that the organization 
has sole jurisdiction over
religious-based disputes.
2 37 Accordingly, in a congregational church,
courts defer to the decisions made in accordance 
with the congrega-
tion's internal decisionmaking process;
238 in a hierarchical church,
courts defer to the decisions made by the 
church's highest religious
authority.2 3
9
C. Power over the Ministerial Relationship
The aforementioned spheres of church 
autonomy each involve
disputes between different factions of a 
religious organization. The
third sphere draws on aspects of those two 
spheres and suggests that
234 See supra Part II. A natural counterargument 
to this claim is that courts consist-
ently refuse to apply Title VII, a neutral law, 
to ministerial employees. See infra notes
245-46 and accompanying text. However, churches 
enjoy Title VII protection not
because it interferes with the sphere of autonomy 
protecting church authority, but
because it interferes with the sphere of autonomy 
protecting the church-minister rela-
tionship. See infra Part III.C.
235 See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic Archbishop 
of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, 852
(Bankr. D. Or. 2005) ("[T]he question of whether property 
is part of the bankruptcy
estate under the Bankruptcy Code does not 
require [resolving] matters of faith, doc-
trine, or governance.").
236 See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722-29 
(1871).
237 See id. at 729. Of course, the dogmatic 
sphere of church autonomy allows a
court to consult written documents to determine 
to which faction of a religious organ-
ization it should defer only if the provisions 
are sufficiently express so that it avoids
interpreting religious doctrine.
238 See id. at 724-25.
239 See id. at 726-27.
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religious organizations enjoy a varied amount of freedom over the
church-minister relationship.2 40
This sphere of autonomy draws its strength from Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop.241 The petitioner claimed a right to a relig-
ious appointment, but the Catholic Church refused to appoint him
because he did not meet the established qualifications.2 42 Ruling for
the church, the Supreme Court said that "[b] ecause the appointment
is a canonical act, it is the function of the church authorities to deter-
mine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether
the candidate possesses them."243 Furthermore, the Court noted that
"[i)n the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of
the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular
courts as conclusive." 244
Courts have adopted a categorical rule that allows churches to
hire and fire ministers. The "ministerial exception" is the most com-
mon application of this sphere of the church autonomy doctrine. 245
Courts of appeals have unanimously found that the ministerial excep-
tion protects churches from liability in Title VII employment dis-
putes.246 The principal controversy concerning the ministerial
exception governs its scope-who exactly can courts consider a "min-
240 See Brady, supra note 32, at 1651-56 & nn.l10-44 (describing the application
of the ministerial exception and collecting cases).
241 280 U.S. 1 (1929). Like Watson, Gonzalez was decided as a matter of federal
common law. Laycock, supra note 6, at 1389 n.129.
242 See Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 12-13.
243 Id. at 16. As the Court later said, "[ffreedom to select the clergy, where no
improper methods of choice are proven ... must now be said to have federal constitu-
tional protection as part of the free exercise of religion against state interference."
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
244 Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16.
245 The Fifth Circuit was the first court to explicitly recognize this exception in
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-61 (5th Cir. 1972). Other circuits have
followed suit. See infra note 246.
246 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 305 (3d Cir. 2006); Alicea-Her-
nandez v. Catholic Bishop, 320 F.3d 698, 702-04 (7th Cir. 2003); Gellington v. Chris-
tian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000);
Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945-50 (9th Cir. 1999);
Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir.
1991); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explicitly con-
cluded the ministerial exception survived Smith. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am.,
83 F.3d 455, 463-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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ister" for the purposes of the exception?
2 47 Courts have expanded the
ministerial exception to include church officials beyond 
ordained
clergy.248 For example, courts have considered 
a communications
officer,2 49 a director of music ministry,
250 and a teacher at a religious
university25 1 to fall within the exception. In a few 
cases, the question
of who can be considered a "minister" (compared to an administrative
worker) hinged on a determination of the role religion played 
in a
decision to terminate an employee.
252 Yet for the most part, courts
have not required a religious element-if a church-minister 
relation-
ship is implicated, courts refrain from 
adjudicating the dispute.2 53
The church-minister relationship receives protection 
outside the
Title VII context, but courts are split over the extent 
of that the pro-
tection. For example, courts have overwhelmingly 
rejected claims of
clergy malpractice. 254 Courtsjustify such decisions by concluding 
that
247 Compare EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 
(5th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that
ministers include those who are "intermediaries 
between a church and its congrega-
tion" who "attend to religious needs of the faithful 
[or] instruct students in the whole
of religious doctrine"), with Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (stating 
more broadly that a
determination of who is a minister hinges on the 
question of "whether a position is
important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of 
the church"), and Bagni, supra note
164, at 1545 (defining ministers as those whose "primary 
duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision 
of a religious order, or supervi-
sion or participation in religious ritual or worship").
248 See Brady, supra note 32, at 1653.
249 Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 704.
250 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 
213 F.3d 795, 805 (4th Cir.
2000).
251 Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 457.
252 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton 
Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S.
619, 628 (1986) (stating that a state administrative board 
"violates no constitutional
rights by merely investigating the circumstances 
of [an employee's] discharge ... if
only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based 
reason was in fact the reason
for the discharge"); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y 
of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947
(9th Cir. 1999) (declining to apply the ministerial exception 
in the absence of any
"religious justification for the harassment"); McKelvey v. Pierce, 
800 A.2d 840, 851
(N.J. 2002) ("Although the church autonomy doctrine provides 
a shield against exces-
sive government incursion . . . [it] is implicated only in 
those situations where 'the
alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief.'" 
(quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church
in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 2002))).
253 See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that in "'quintessentially 
religious' matters, the free
exercise clause . . . protects the act of a decision 
rather than a motivation behind it"
(citation omitted) (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese 
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 720 (1976))).
254 See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker, 913 S.W.2d 761, 
767 (Ark. 1996) (holding clergy
malpractice was not a cognizable claim); Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 
763 P.2d 948,
961 (Cal. 1998) (rejecting a malpractice claim where a suicide allegedly 
resulted from
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the application of a neutral principle of law-determining the appro-
priate standard of conduct for a religious leader-necessarily requires
an inquiry into religious principles.255 Churches have also enjoyed
protection from defamation claims arising out of church communica-
tions256 and in lawsuits governing a breach of an employment
contract.
257
However, some courts express reluctance to protect church
autonomy when the church-minister relationship can be regulated by
statute and does not interfere with either of the two other spheres of
church autonomy. For example, many courts conclude that some
aspects of the church-minister relationship can be regulated, includ-
ing whether a fired minister can receive unemployment benefits, 258
whether ministers may organize under state collective bargaining
laws,259 whether religious employees are empowered to receive broad
insurance coverage,2 60 and whether supervisors can be found liable
failed religious counseling); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So. 2d 747,
763-64 (Miss. 2004) (finding that clergy malpractice claims would "excessively entan-
gle" the court with religious tenets); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d
907, 912 (Neb. 1993) (acknowledging the "constitutional difficulties" in adjudicating
a clergy malpractice claim); In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85,
89-90 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding that the First Amendment barred inquiry into the
proper application of church doctrine). But see Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 438-41 (Minn. 2002) (holding that a negli-
gence claim can proceed based on neutral legal principles provided by statute).
Some courts have distinguished breach of fiduciary duty from clergy malpractice, and
found courts can adjudicate the former because "the former is a breach of trust and
does not require a professional relationship or a professional standard of care, while
the latter is an action for negligence based on a professional relationship and a pro-
fessional standard of care." Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 321 n.13 (Colo.
1993).
255 Nally, 763 P.2d at 960 (reasoning that defining a standard of care for clergy
malpractice "would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the
particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity").
256 E.g., Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732,
742 (D.NJ. 1999), aff'd, 263 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2001); Se. Conference Ass'n of Seventh-
Day Adventists, Inc. v. Dennis, 862 So. 2d 842, 843-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bat., 683 A.2d 808, 811-13 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996); Patton v. Jones, No. 03-04-00389-CV, 2006 WL 2082974, at *3-4 (Tex.
App. July 28, 2006).
257 See Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami, Inc., 712 So. 2d 775, 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) ("Inquiring into the adequacy of the religious reasoning behind the dismissal
of a spiritual leader is not a proper task for a civil court.").
258 See Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley, 56 P.3d 386, 394 (Or. 2002).
259 See S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 723-24 (N.J. 1997).
260 See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465
(N.Y. 2006) ("The existence of a limited exemption for ministers from antidiscrimina-
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for negligence in clergy abuse cases.
26 1 Ultimately, determining the
extent to which the church-minister relationship 
should be protected
by the church autonomy doctrine far exceeds the 
scope of this Note.
It suffices to say that when it comes to the church-minister 
relation-
ship, churches generally enjoy complete protection to hire 
and fire
ministers but exercise considerably less discretion 
in other contexts if
the applicable standard of care has been defined 
by statute.
D. Possible Exceptions to These Spheres
The aforementioned spheres of religious autonomy 
often overlap
as they prohibit courts from applying the neutral 
principles of law
approach. However, some language in Supreme 
Court opinions sug-
gests the protection provided by these spheres 
is not absolute. The
Court said in Gonzalez that decisions of church 
tribunals must be
deferred to "[iln the absence of fraud, collusion, 
or arbitrariness. 2
2
The Illinois Supreme Court seized on the "arbitrariness" 
language in
Milivojevich, concluding that the Serbian Orthodox Church 
had arbi-
trarily determined that a bishop should be 
defrocked.2653 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that such actions 
involved imper-
missible interpretation of religious doctrine
264:
For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical 
actions of a
church judicatory are in that sense "arbitrary" must inherently
entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical 
law
supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the
substantive criteria by which they are supposedly 
to decide the
ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry 
that the First
Amendment prohibits... [because it undermines the general 
rule
that] a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church
tribunals as it finds them.
265
tion laws does not translate into an absolute right for 
a religiously affiliated employer
to structure all aspects of its relationship with its 
employees in conformity with church
teachings.").
261 See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360-64 
(Fla. 2002); Roman Catholic
Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 
1241-42 (Miss. 2005).
262 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 
280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
263 See Serbian E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 
328 N.E.2d 268, 281-82 (111.
1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
264 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721-23.
265 Id. at 713.
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With the arbitrariness exception thus prohibited, it is unclear to
what extent the other perceived prohibitions might exist.2 66 For
example, a court struggles to apply the fraud exception without involv-
ing itself in a religious inquiry. The essence of a fraud claim is a mate-
rial misrepresentation, and the process of determining whether a
misrepresentation occurred would necessarily require a court to
determine the content of religious doctrine. 267 In any event, no court
has relied on the language of Gonzalez to evaluate and interpret relig-
ious doctrine in cases of fraud or collusion.
IV. EXTERNAL PROTECTIONS FOR CHURCH AUTONOMY
This proposed framework for applying the church autonomy doc-
trine already has several inherent protections for church autonomy.
First, before a court presumes it can apply a "neutral principle of law,"
it must first determine whether that "principle of law" is in fact neu-
tral. Under the Court's neutrality definition, a court can apply a prin-
ciple of law if it does not target beliefs or restrict religious practices
purely because of their religious quality.2 6 Second, a church can
rebut this presumption and protect its autonomy by proving that the
application of the neutral principle of law interferes with one of the
three aforementioned constitutionally protected spheres of
autonomy.
This framework does not address the entire universe of protec-
tion for religious-group autonomy. In addition to the protections
already built into this framework for fixing the church autonomy doc-
trine, the Smith Court provided two external methods by which relig-
ious institutions can protect church autonomy. First, Smith hinted
that other constitutional provisions might adequately protect individ-
ual religious practices. 269 Second, Smith noted that when other consti-
tutional protections do not exist, legislatures could step in to create
religious-based exemptions. 270 In the church autonomy context, the
266 Then-Justice Rehnquist apparently believed that the provisions survived. See
Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin., v. Cal. Super. Ct., 439 U.S 1369, 1372-73 (1978)
(Rehnquist, Circuit J.).
267 See Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts
on Selected Issues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 85, 143-50 (1997).
268 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993); see also supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (exploring the connection
between the Lukumi Babalu standard of neutral laws and court-defined neutral
principles).
269 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
270 See id. at 890.
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latter method has proven far more successful 
at protecting the values
espoused by those who favor broad protection 
of church autonomy.
While other constitutional provisions theoretically 
provide alter-
native sources of protection,2
7l courts are relatively hostile to such
arguments. For example, lower courts rejecting a church autonomy
defense frequently also consider whether the Free 
Exercise Clause or
the Establishment Clause has been violated.
2 72 Many statutes that
attempt to distinguish between "secular" and 
"religious" activity for
the purposes of creating exemptions may conflict 
with the Establish-
ment Clause.2 73 Likewise, free exercise problems 
may develop if a
state passes laws that impermissibly interfere with 
a church's religious
activities. 274 No court has rejected a church autonomy defense, 
yet
held government action unconstitutional under 
either of the Religion
Clauses.2 75 It accordingly remains unclear how 
much the Religion
271 See id. at 881-82.
272 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson 
v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213,
1224-37 (Miss. 2005). This argument is stronger if one believes 
that the church
autonomy doctrine draws its constitutional strength 
from both the Religion Clauses.
See supra note 62.
273 Cf infra notes 302-04 and accompanying text (providing guidelines 
for draft-
ing statutes designed to exempt religious activities 
from certain laws).
274 As the Supreme Court has said, "a State would 
be 'prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]' if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only 
when they are engaged
in for religious reasons, or only because of the 
religious belief that they display."
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (alterations in original). Professor McConnell 
suggests, under
a view that the Constitution never requires a religious 
exemption, that
religious believers and institutions cannot challenge 
facially neutral legisla-
tion, no matter what effect it may have on their ability 
or freedom to practice
their religious faith. Thus, a requirement that 
all witnesses must testify to
facts within their knowledge bearing on a criminal 
prosecution ... if applied
without exception, could abrogate the confidentiality 
of the confessional.
Similarly, a general prohibition on alcohol consumption 
could make the
Christian sacrament of communion illegal, uniform 
regulation of meat prep-
aration could put kosher slaughterhouses out of business, 
and prohibitions
of discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status 
could end the male
celibate priesthood.
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding 
of Free Exercise of Relig-
ion, 103 HARV. L. Rrv. 1409, 1418-19 (1990). Courts that cite 
McConnell's passage
often label such "hypothetical laws" to be "well beyond 
the bounds of constitutional
acceptability." Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany 
v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459,
467 (N.Y. 2006). The mere fact that legislatures do not pass 
such sweeping laws
implicitly speaks to the protection the Religion Clauses 
provide.
275 One possible explanation for this conduct is that 
when faced with a violation of
the First Amendment, a court will simply ignore a church 
autonomy defense given the
murky state of the doctrine.
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Clauses independently protect church autonomy when the doctrine
itself fails.
Smith also noted that the only instances where a neutral, gener-
ally applicable law did not apply to religiously motivated conduct
involved the application of the Free Exercise Clause in connection
with some other constitutional protection. 76 Although commenta-
tors have largely scoffed at these so-called hybrid constitutional
rights,27 7 at least one court has relied on this language in Smith to
excuse a church from liability.2 78 Finally, Smith suggested that relig-
ious individuals could bring suits seeking to protect their free associa-
tion rights on grounds informed by First Amendment principles.2 79
However, no religious organization has specifically relied on this pas-
sage in Smith to successfully protect some aspect of church autonomy.
Second, Smith declared that legislatures, not courts, should create
individual-based exemptions to generally applicable laws.28 0 Admit-
tedly, a clear constitutional rule established by courts generally pro-
tects a constitutional right better than trusting a legislature to protect
276 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
277 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1992),
Justice Souter attacked the concept of hybrid rights as "ultimately untenable," writing:
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is impli-
cated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the
Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation
exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights are certainly
implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a liti-
gant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally
applicable law under another constitutional provision, then there would
have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to
have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.
Id at 567 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, Wen a
"Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid
Rights Exception ", 108 PENN ST. L. Rev. 573, 587-609 (2003) (chronicling the lack of
success of hybrid rights challenges following Smith); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil
Is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1045, 1060-73 (2000) (exploring how Smith's hybrid rights discussion has con-
fused lower courts).
278 See Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286, 293
(Ind. 2003). But see id. at 294-96 (Sullivan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (questioning whether the church autonomy doctrine survived Smith and sug-
gesting that even if it did, neutral principles could be applied to adjudicate the case at
hand because neither party suggested that the position at issue would have involved
ministerial-type duties).
279 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
280 See id. at 890.
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that same right.281 As a practical matter, however, 
legislatures have
not hesitated to grant religious institutions a 
plethora of exemptions.
In the United States Code alone, churches 
enjoy numerous exemp-
tions from otherwise generally applicable laws,
28 2 age-based 28 3 and dis-
ability-based discrimination laws,
28 4 certain kinds of tax laws,
28 5 land
use regulations,'28
6 gambling laws, 28 7 labor laws,
288 and fair housing
laws.28 9 In fact, one study concluded that 
since 1989, "more than 200
special arrangements, protections, or exemptions 
for religious groups
or their adherents" were codified in federal 
law. 2 90 Indeed, the prob-
lem is not that churches receive too few exemptions; 
the proliferation
of these religious-based exemptions at the 
federal, state, and local
levels has drawn some criticism.
2 9 1 The same concerns about placing
281 See id. ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation 
to the political pro-
cess will place at a relative disadvantage those 
religious practices that are not widely
engaged in .... "); id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("[T]he First Amendment
was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those 
whose religious practices are not
shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility.").
282 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (2000); see also Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987)
(holding that § 2000e-1 does not violate the Establishment 
Clause).
283 See Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 106-07, 
109 (2d Cir. 2006). In Hankins, the
court concluded that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 § 3, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1, carved out a religious-based exemption to the 
Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Id.
284 42 U.S.C. § 12187.
285 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (including churches in the list of 
charitable and other non-
profit corporations that can qualify for tax-exempt 
status). But see Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 
392 (1990) (holding that religious-
based organizations must pay a generally applicable 
sales tax when selling religious
materials).
286 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000
§ 2(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (l).
287 18 U.S.C. § 1955(e).
288 Cf NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 
U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979) (construing
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, 
to exclude parochial schools
from compliance with the Act).
289 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a).
290 Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation 
as Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y.
TiMEs, Oct. 8, 2006, § 1, at 1.
291 See Diana B. Henriques, As Religious Programs 
Expand, Disputes Rise over Tax
Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at Al (discussing property 
tax exemptions); Diana B.
Henriques, Religion Based Tax Breaks: Housing to Paychecks 
to Books, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2006, at Al (explaining how ministers "are exempt from 
income tax withholding and
can opt out of Social Security"); Henriques, supra note 290 
(discussing hbow churches
enjoy exemptions from state day care licensing requirements, 
civil rights laws, tax
reporting requirements, land use restrictions, and 
broadcasting restrictions); Diana B.
Henriques, Sharing the Health Bills: A Ministry's 
Medical Program Operates Beyond Regula-
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responsibility for the creation of individual religious exemptions in
the political process perceived in Smith apply with equal force in the
context of religious groups: "[L] eaving accommodation to the politi-
cal process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious prac-
tices that are not widely engaged in."292
However, giving legislatures, and not courts, the responsibility to
create these religious-based exemptions correctly acknowledges that
legislatures are better equipped to determine the proper scope of
these protections.2 93 For example, the New York State Assembly strug-
gled to define who was a "religious employer" for purposes of deter-
mining who could claim they were exempt from a requirement to
provide insurance coverage for contraceptive methods.294 One
option would define a religious employer as any "'group or entity...
supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organiza-
tion or denominational group or entity."' 2 95 A second and narrower
definition required prospective religious employers to satisfy a four-
prong test.2 96 Based on extensive analysis of the issue, and after hear-
ing significant testimony from both sides, the legislature ultimately
adopted the narrower definition.297 By contrast, a court decision on
such an important policy matter could only be based on the facts and
views of the parties to the dispute. 298
In crafting these statutory exemptions, legislatures should keep in
mind two drafting principles. First, when faced with a decision about
whether a legislature meant to apply a neutral, generally applicable
law to a religious organization, courts will construe an ambiguous stat-
ute to exclude the religious organization. The seminal case is NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,299 where the Supreme Court concluded
Congress did not intend for the National Labor Relations Act to apply
tors' Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at CI (describing what some state officials call
.unregulated health insurance"); Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees
Have Few Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at Al (exploring the ministerial exception).
292 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
293 See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1193-96.
294 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221()(16)(A) (McKinney 2006).
295 Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 462 (N.Y.
2006) (quoting S.B. 3, § 14, 2001-02 Reg. Leg., 224th Sess. (N.Y. 2001)).
296 See id. at 461 (quoting N.Y. INS. LAw § 3221(l) (16) (A) (1)).
297 See id. at 461-62; cf. Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1195 (noting how a legislature
"brings better tools to assess the exemption options than a court has available"
because "[i]t can study the issue from many angles, from listening to constituents to
using hearings, experts, and appointed commissions").
298 See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 1196.
299 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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to teachers in religious schools.300 However, other courts more read-
ily concluded that legislatures intended labor laws to cover religious
employers.301 Second, when defining what entities qualify for exemp-
tions, legislatures should carefully craft such statutory exemptions in
light of existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court has clearly recognized that "it is a permissible legislative pur-
pose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability
of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious mis-
sions. ''3°2 But while legislative bodies can use the word "religion" in
statutes, they should avoid defining the scope of the religious conduct
with particularity. Laws and regulations can exempt certain religious
activities and not others, 303 but they cannot create so-called religious
tests. 30
4
300 Id. at 507 ("[I]n the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent ... we
decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to
resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses.").
301 Eg., S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 713-14 (N.J. 1997) (concluding that the New
Jersey Constitution was meant to cover workers not protected by the National Labor
Relations Act, and therefore included the employees of a religious school). Unlike in
Catholic Bishop, where the Supreme Court "avoided the constitutional claims that were
asserted," id. at 714, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately concluded that the
state constitution did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 714-24.
302 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
303 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 76-95
(Cal. 2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 464
(N.Y. 2006). The law at issue in both cases exempted religious entities for whom "the
inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity," "[tlbe entity primarily
employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity," "Itjhe entity serves pri-
marily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity," and the "entity is a non-
profit organization" as defined by the Internal Revenue Service. CAL. HEALTH &
SA+ETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (1) (West 2000); see also N.Y. INS. LAw § 3221(l) (16) (A) (1)
(McKinney 2006) (containing identical language to the California statute).
304 See, e.g., Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477,481-82 (10th Cir. 1980), affd, 456 U.S.
951 (1982). In Espinosa, the court struck down a local ordinance that required orga-
nizations to obtain a permit to conduct a solicitation drive. The ordinance exempted
.religious" activities, which included solicitations by religious groups "solely for 'evan-
gelical, missionary or religious but not secular purposes.'" Id. at 479 (quoting local
ordinance at issue). The ordinance also defined secular as " 'not spiritual or ecclesias-
tical, but rather relating to affairs of the present world, such as providing food, cloth-
ing, and counseling." Id. (quoting local ordinance at issue). As the court said, the
attempt to define "that which is religious and that which is secular" is "necessarily a
suspect effort." Id. at 481.
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CONCLUSION
Religious organizations serve a valuable function in society.
Those who have argued for an expansive right to church autonomy,
free from government regulation except in the most extreme cases,
point to the intrinsic value of strong church independence and the
resulting need for a deferential doctrine of religious group auton-
omy.3 15 As a normative matter, such views have merit. However, from
a historical and precedential perspective, and in light of the practical
problems with applying the church autonomy doctrine, those broad
claims are misplaced.
After Jones, courts need not extend absolute deference to relig-
ious organizations as a constitutional matter. However, they have
struggled to consistently determine when the application of neutral
principles of law constitutes unconstitutional interference with the
internal affairs of a church. In light of demonstrated judicial incom-
petence to make such decisions on a case-by-case basis, the historical
attitude toward religious groups evident at the time of the Founding,
and the First Amendment principles announced in Smith, courts
should simply presume they can properly apply neutral principles of
law. It makes no difference whether the common law or statutory pro-
visions provide the applicable neutral principle.
All is not lost for those seeking strong protection for the internal
affairs of a church. Under this Note's framework for evaluating a
church autonomy claim, churches could rebut this general presump-
tion by showing how government action interferes with one of three
constitutionally protected spheres of autonomy. First, the govern-
ment cannot infringe upon the power of a church to declare how it
will worship or interpret its own religious doctrine. Second, the gov-
ernment cannot interfere with the power of a church to make broad
structural decisions or adjudicate other internal religious disputes
regarding which faction of a church has the power to govern. Third,
the government cannot interfere with the power of a church to hire
and fire its ministers, and other aspects of the church-minister rela-
tionship may also lie beyond the power of the government. Even if
305 See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective Bargain-
ing Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49 VILL. L. REv. 77,
167 (2004) (suggesting that broad freedom from government interference enables
religious organizations to "preserve [e) new visions of social life for us all"); Garnett,
supra note 147, at 82 (arguing that broad religious freedom is important "for the role
that it plays not only in securing religious freedom and pluralism under constitution-
ally limited government, but in facilitating the development and flourishing of
persons").
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the church autonomy doctrine does not provide adequate protection,
or when courts err about the degree of impermissible intervention
that may occur, other constitutional provisions and legislative action
might defend church autonomy.
While the church autonomy doctrine generally serves a norma-
tive good by providing limited protection for religious freedom, relig-
ious institutions cannot escape liability for their actions as a
constitutional matter insofar as government entities can regulate their
conduct by neutral principles of law. This framework, corrects the
problems inherent in case-by-case application of the church autonomy
doctrine and, like Smith, imposes burdens upon church autonomy
rather than extend religious institutions carte blanche to do as they
please. Furthermore, Smith establishes that courts-and by extension,
the Constitution-have little to say when it comes to constructing
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Instead, as the
Court correctly noted and as this framework entails, the proper entity
for granting additional religious-based exemptions "shall be the
people . 30 6
306 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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